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IN 7HE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

--------------------- --------------------------------------VELMA GLADYS YATES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
VERNAL FAMILY HEALTH CENTER,
a project of Division of Family and
Community Medicine, University of
Utah; UINTAH COUNTY HOSPITAL;
VERNAL DRUG COMPANY, a Utah
corporation; and GORDON LEE
BALK A, M. D. ,

Case No. 16602

Defendants-Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
GORDON LEE BALKA, M.D.
NATURE OF THE CASE
This was an action for alleged medical malpractice,

controlled

by

the

Utah

Section 78-14-1, et seq.

Heal th

Care Malpractice

Act,

(All statutory references are to

the Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended, unless otherwise
indicated.)
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The

action

was

dismissed

for

failure

to

comply

with Section 78-14-8 (1979, as amended), requiring notice of
intent to bring an action as a condition precedent to suit.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent Balka seeks an affirmation of the tri~
court's Order dismissing the suit.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Gordo~

Appellant had been a patient of respondent
Lee Balka, M.D.,
to

March

of

prescribed
lant.

for

a period of some fifteen months prior

1977.

During

various

this

medications

period,

in

his

respondent

treatment

of

Balka

appel-

These prescriptions were filled by respondent Vernal

Drug Company.
respondent

On March 12, 1977, appellant was admitted to

Uintah

incoherent"

County

condition,

Hospital

apparently

in
the

a

"disoriented

result

of

ana

consuming

large and excessive quantities of the prescribed drugs.

She

developed "continual convulsive seizures" and on approxirnately .March

15,

1977,

Salt Lake County.

6,

1977,

County

was

transferred

to

a

hospital in

The seizures were controlled and on April

appellant

Hospital

she

was

where

she

re-admitted

to

respondent

remained

until

her

Uintah

dis charge on

April 1 2, 197 7.
On April 7,

1978, a letter was sent to respondent
The letter was signec

Balka (and three other respondents).
by

his

appellant's
2ttorney,

"Attorney

for

husband,
Robert M.
Claimant".

differentiates appellant

11arzine Yates

as

McRae,

express

The
(who

in

the

text

of

claimant,

the

is referred

and bi'

capacity of

letter

clearli'

to as "claimant''
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wife")

from

her

husband.

The

letter

gives

notice

that

appellant's husband, not appellant,
"potentially is asserting and claiming and may
commence a ~ivil act~on for damages arising
out of possible negligent [professional conduct]".
On
filed

an

July

action

19,

1978,

appellant,

not

her

claiming medical malpractice.

husband,
While

the

Complaint established only one cause of action, the alleged
wrongful

conduct

prescribing

of

consisted of

three "counts":

the medications;

second,

First, the

the furnishing

of

the same; third, the care appellant received while in Uintah
County Hospital during March of 1977.
Appellant further claimed that in March of 1978 it
was discovered

that she was suffering from "permanent cen-

tral nervous system disorders,"

caused by the alleged neg-

ligent conduct.
On

August

7,

1978,

respondent

Answer, which established four defenses.
is relevant here.
file

Balka

filed

his

The fourth defense

It alleged that appellant had failed to

a Notice of Intent to Commence Action as required by

the Utah Health Care ~lalpractice Act, specifically Section
78-14-8, u.c.A. (1979, as amended).
Respondent Balka's response gave appellant notice
of his failure to comply with the Act.
lant refused

to file

Nevertheless, appel-

a proper notice, contending that the

April 7 letter was sufficient.

The trial court disagreed,
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and on July 25,

1979, after tl,e statute of limitations had

run on appellant's cause of action, issued its order dismissing appellant's Complaint on the grounds of failure to file
a Notice of Intent to

Co~~ence

Action as required.

This appeal followed.
L

APPELLANT'S COMPLAINT WAS PROPEHLY DISMISSED
BECA'JSE OF FAILURE TO COMPLY WI'I'H THE PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH HEALTH CARJ:: /1Jl.J,PRACTICE ACT
In his action, appellant
78-14-8, U.C.A.

(1979, as amended).

failed

to comply wi.th

This section requires a

potential plaintiff in a health care malpractice action to
issue

a

action.

prescribed

form

of

notice

prior

to

initiating an

In the instant case there has been neither "strict"

nor even "substantial", complaince with the statute.
The statute states:
78-14-8.
Notice of intent to commence
action.
No malpractice action against a
health care provider may be initiated unless and until the plaintiff gives the prospective defendant or his executor or successor, at least ninety days'
prior notice of
intent to commence an action.
Such notice
shall include a general statement of the nature of the claim, the persons involved,
the
date, time and place of the occurrence,
the
circumstances thereof,
specific allegations
of misconduct on the part of the prospective
defendant, the nature of the alleged injuries
and other damages sustained.
Notice may be
in letter or affidavit form executed by the
plaintiff or his attorney.
Service shall be
accomplished by persons authorized and in the
manner prescribed by the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure for thr2 service of tlle sumJC,ons and
-4Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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complaint in a civil action or by certified
mail, return receipt requested, in which case
notice shall be deemed to have been served on
the date of mailing.
Such notice shall be
served within the time allowed for commencing
a malpractice action against a health care
provider. If the notice is served less than
ninety days prior to the expiration of the
applicable time period, the time for commencing the malpractice action against the health
care provider shall be extended to 120 days
from the date of service of notice.
This section shall, for purposes of determining its retroactivity, not be construed as
relating to the limitation on the time for commencing any action, and shall apply only to
causes of action arising on or after April 1,
1976. This section shall not apply to third
party actions, counterclaims or crossclaims
against a health care provider.
(Emphasis added.)
The notice must be given by the plaintiff (not by
a relative of the plaintiff), and it must be signed by the
plaintiff,

or

the

plaintiff's

attorney

(as opposed to the

attorney of a family member).
Under the pertinent statute (and the statute as it
existed

prior

to

amendment)

the

letter

which

appellant

asserts gives the required notice is clearly defective.
letter

is written on

the

letterhead of

Robert M.

The

McRae

Associates, and it states:
April 7, 1978
"Pursuant to 78-14-8 UCA, notice is herewith given that Harzine Yates, husband of Velma
Yates, potentially is asserting and claiming
and may co~~ence a civil action for damages
arising out of possible negligent prescribing,
negligent dispensing of drugs or other forms of
prescribed medicine, and negligent hospitaliza-5-
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&

tion and treatment of his wife.
In compliance
with the aforesaid section of the Utah Code, it
is believed and will be alleged in the event a
civil action is co~nenced that from approximately March, 1976 until March, 1978, claimant's
wife received prescriptions from the Vernal Drug
Company believed to have been prescribed by Dr.
Lee Balka in his official capacity as a partner
or responsible agent of the Vernal Family Health
Center, which prescriptions, in combination of
use or seperate, were dispensed in an excessive
amount which has resulted in permanent mental
damage to claimant's wife.
It is further believed that as a result of the prolonged excess
abuse of the prescription medication, the seizure and subsequent coma which claimant's wife
suffered approximately one year ago were possibly the result of negligence."

The

"claimant", or

potential

to in the letter is Marzine Yates.
red

to as "claimant's wife".

plaintiff, referred

Appellant is only refer-

The letter is signed by the

"claimant", Marzine Yates,

and by Robert M.

capacity of

Claimant",

"Attorney

for

a

complaint based on the

appellant

filed

the

action.

as

attorney for

alleged malpractice,
This

in the

Marzine Yates did not

appellant (i.e. Velma Gladys Yates).
file

not

McRae,

respondent's

rather

answer to

that complaint asserted as a defense the lack of notice
gave

appellant

clear

and

fair

warning

of

the

defect

a~

in

sufficient time to effect a cure and preserve the cause of
action.

Nevertheless,

appellant

(through

her

attorney)

refused to submit a proper notice as required by the statute.
A

statement

regarding

the

general

rule

as

U

notice requirements in medical malpractice cases is founrl 1n
-6--
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61

Am.Jur.2d 306, Physicians, Surgeons, etc.,§

180, where

it states:
§ 180.

Statutory notice of injury.

Where a statute exists requiring a person
claiming to have received personal injuries to
serve a detailed notice, in writing, of such
injuries upon the person by whom it is claimed
these injuries were caused, within a limited
time after the occurrence of such injuries, it
has been held that the statute applies to actions for malpractice whether they sound in contract or in tort. Such a statute must be strictly complied with, and all matters required
by the statute to be stated in the notice or
its equivalent must be stated, or it is not sufficient, and the service of summons, affidavits,
notice of adverse examination, and subpoena cannot operate as compliance with the statute where
one of the essential facts required to be stated
in the notice is omitted therefrom. Such a statute, properly speaking, is not a statute of limitations.
(Emphasis added.)
The above

state~ent

refers to statutes dealing with personal

injury claims generally, while the Utah statute in question
is

specifically

directed

The significance of this

at

medical

malpractice

actions.

is discussed below, as it relates

to effectuating the public purpose which the statute seeks
to serve.
In Vealey v. Clegg, 579 P.2d 919 (Utah 1978), this
court

held

that

constitutional

the

(see

notice
Point

requirement

II

of

this

of

§

brief),

78-14-8
that

is

giving

notice serves to "toll" the statute of limitations (by means
of extension) when necessary to preserve an action, and that
the

filing

and

service

of

a

-7-

complaint

(which

necessarily
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contains

all

the

information required

in the

notice)

does

not satisfy the statute's notice requirements.
The importance of Vealey, supra, as it relates

~

the case at bar is that there, as here, the appellant assertea

that a

required

document,

by

the
That

statute.

containing

the

statute,

constituted

complaint

contained

pertinent

information

compliance
virtually

with

the

every

itm

required by the statute, never-the-less this court held:
• • that the statute requires notice to be
given ninety days before the action is filed."
The complaint was not eguivalant to the required notice, and
therefore

was

properly

dismissed.

Further,

the

filing of

the complaint, as such, would not serve to extend the

satu~

of limitations.
Here, unlike Vealey, the purported notice did not
contain the essential facts required by the statute.
notably,

it did

not

indicate who

the

Most

plaintiff would be.

Moreover, it was misleading as to the nature of the cause of
action asserted.

By reference

to

the

one would only be appraised of Mr.

letter

Yates'

in question, '

potential action

to recover medical and other expenses and for
wife's

services

and

never the plaintiff
the

letter

appellant.

failed
When

consortium.

In

fact,

loss of his

Mr.

Yates

was

in any action based on the letter and
to

give

notice

compared

to

of

the

the

action

asserted

filed

by

"notice"

in

Vealey, a fortiori the letter here is insufficient to serve
-8-
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notice as required by Section 78-14-8 U.C.A. (1979).
This court addressed the notice requirement in the
recent

case

1979).

of

In Foil

Foil

v.

Ballinger,

601

P.2d

144

(Utah

the court held that the statute of limit-

ations in medical malpractice actions commences to run from
the

date

of

the

injury

should

or

have

from
been

the

date

discovered

the
by

injury
the

was

discovered

or

person

inj urea. 1

Also at issue in Foil was whether Section 78-12-

40 U.C.A.

(1953) operated to toll the statute of limitations

when no notice as required by Section 78-14-8, u.c.A. (1979)
had been filed within the statutory period.
The significance of Foil is to be found in certain
dicta which provides a guide to the proper construction to
be given the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act
and Section 78-14-8, U.C.A.

in general,

(1979), in particular.

In the Foil case (at pages 4 and 5 of the advance
sheets) it states:
• • it is important to keep in focus
the proposition that that section deals only
with malpractice actions against health care
providers; it is not a general statute of
limitation on personal injury actions as such."
"One of the chief purposes of the Utah
Health Care Malpractice Act was to prevent the
filing of unjustified lawsuits against health
care providers, with all the attendant costs,
economic and otherwise, that such suits entail."

1 (The term "discovered" is here loos ly used.
"Discovery" of the
inJury relates not only to the mere act of injury, but also to
the fact that it was caused by an ac of medical malpractice.)
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

And

at

page

8,

specifically

dealing

with

the

statute in

question here:

Section 78-14-8 merely prescribes a condition
precedent to the filing of a summons or a complaint. A failure to comply with such conditions does not constitute an adjudication on
the merits, but is merely a procedural defect
that does not relate to the merits of the basic
action in any way. There are numerous instances in which the law requires fulfillment of a
condition precedent before the filing of a complaint, and failure to comply with the condition
may result in a dismissal, but not on the merits.
Obviously,
(1979)
such

is required,

notice

is

a

notice

as

per

regardless of
condition

Section 78-14-8

U.C.A.

the tolling statute and

precedent

which

must

before a medical malpractice action may be brought.

be

met

While

the condition precedent is merely procedural, compliance is
never-the-less mandatory.
As

to

the

purpose

Section 78-14-8, U.C.A.

of

the

recent

(1979), at p.10

amendment

in Foil, the court

states:

"The amendment to §78-14-8 was made to
establish the Legislature's intent that a notice of intent to sue was not the operative fact
in the co~~encement of an action and that the
notice was not applicable to causes of action
arising prior to enactment of the Malpractice
Act.
In part, at least, the amendment was in
response to this Court's holding in Vealey.
Changes made in §78-14-8 are strictly and purely
remedial in nature. They do not serve to create
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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~

or eliminate any vested interests or causes of
action. They simply govern technical provisions
for the bringing of a malpractice action.
(Emphasis added.)
The amendment obviously has no effect on the notice requirement in this case.
The most significant aid to the proper construetion of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act is to be found
in the text of the statute itself.

Section 78-14-2, U.C.A.

(1953), states:

"In enacting this act, it is the purpose
of the legislature to provide a reasonable
time in which actions may be commenced against
health care providers while limiting that time
to a specific period for which professional
liability insurance premiums can be reasonably
and accurately calculated; and to provide other
procedural changes to expedite early evaluations and settlement of claims."
The patent intention of the legislature was to protect the
public's
many

interest

adverse

in

a

sound

effects which

heal th

care

system from

necessarily attend

sharp increases in medical malpractice cases.

the

the

current

The primary

device to achieve this end is the availability of reasonable
malpractice

insurance for Utah's health care providers and

the provisions of the Act are designed to provide a favorSpecifically, limita-

able environment for such insurance.
tions

are

placed

on

the

bringing

of

medical

malpractice

actions to facilitate reasonable and accurate calculation of
malpractice

insurance premiums.
-11-

The procedures chosen are
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further

expressly designed

to

facilitate

is

to

"early evaluation

and settlement of claims."
The clear
tice actions.

intent

restrict medical malprac-

In addition to the requirement of notice, the

legislature provided a

comprehensive

satute of

limitations

(78-14-4}; fully spelled out all elements, as well as
ses,

to

actions

based

on

informed

consent

defe~

(78-14-5);

and

expressly required a written instrument as a prerequisite to
an action for breach of guarantee on contract in the medical
malpractice
policy, a

field

( 78-14-6).

In

order

to

further

this

strict standard of compliance with the statutory

procedures is required.
The concept of
practice

cases

(and

general)

is not new.

requiring

indeed

for

notice

personal

for medical malinjury

State legislatures have

actions in
long

recog-

nized the beneficial effects that flow from requiring prior
notice in such lawsuits,
aging
ments,

of

frivolous

thus

including, of course, the discour-

suits,

avoiding

and

the

protracted,

encouraging
and

often

of

settle-

undesirab~

litigation.
Our notice statute is plain, unambiguous, and easy
to

comply with.

Indeed,

appellant,

through

her

attorney,

was aware of the insufficiencies of the letter as notice
had ample opportunity to cure any defects.

a~

If the statute

is to be altered, it is for the legislature, not the courts,

-12-
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to effect the change.

If the purposes of the Utah Health

Care Malpractice Act are to be effectuated, substance must
be given to it's provisions.
out must be complied with.

The procedures which it sets

These procedures are specifical-

ly designed to meet dangers to the public welfare, as perceived by the legislature.

The trial court correctly held

that a procedural condition precedent to bringing a medical
malpractice action, had not been complied with, and therefore properly dismissed the action.

II.

THE NOTICE OF INTENT REQUIRED BY § 78-14-8
U.C.A. (1979) DOES NOT OFFEND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES.
The recent case of McGuire v. University of Utah
Medical

Center,

603

P.2d

786

(1979)

answers

appellant's

contention that§ 78-14-8, U.C.A. (1979) is special legislation.
section

It was there argued that the 1979 amendment to that
was

prohibited

special

legislation.

This

court

disagreed, noting:
"That contention cannot withstand analysis.
In Utah Farm Bureau Insuance Co. v. Utah Insurance Guaranty Association, Utah, 564 P.2d 751
(1977), this Court defined a general law as one
which applies to and operates uniformly upon all
members of any class of persons. The 1979 amendment clearly operates uniformly upon a class of
persons: all persons having a cause of action
arising prior to the effective date of the Malpractice Act, whether they have been filed or not
• • • The a:nendrrcent therefore stands on the same
basis, as to tne generality of its application,
-13-
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as does the original notice of intent to sue provision and the statute of limitations 2rovision ~
the Act.
{Emphasis added, p.788)
The McGuire case is obviously sufficient authority
to uphold the constitutionality of the disputed statute.
Appellant asserts that § 78-14-8,

U.C.A.

(1979),

violates three provisions of the Utah Constitution and the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United

States Constitution.

The

following

Utah

Constitu-

tional provisions are allegedly offended:
Article I §2
[All political power inherent
in the people.]
All political power is inherent in the people;
and all free governments are founded on their
authority for their equal protection and benefit, and they have the right to alter or reform their government as the public welfare
may require.

Article I §24

[Uniform operation of laws.]

All laws of a general nature shall have uniform
operation.
Article VI §26

(Private laws forbidden.]

No private or special law shall be
where a geneal law can be applicable.

enacted

Appellant argues denial of equal protection of the
laws.

Of

significant

note

is

the

absence

of

an

allege 1i

violation of due process of law under either the Fouctcent
Amendment to the United States Constitution or Ar-ticlc I
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C,

of the Utah Constitution.
The claim that§ 78-14-8, U.C.A.

(1979)

violates

the Utah Constitution is clearly untenable in light of the
extensive
equal

pronouncements

protection

and

by

this Court on

general

versus

the

special

subject of
legislation.

The general rule is that doubts as to the constitutionality
of

satutes

are

validity.

to

licensed

Court,

resolved

in

favor

of

the

statute's

In Board of Medical Examiners v. Blair, 57 Utah

516, 196 P.2d 221
be

be

in

was

(1921), a law requiring chiropractors to
attacked

upholding

the

on

a

variety

statutory

of

scheme,

grounds.

The

conceded

that

certain of appellant's arguments "had merit" but concluded:
Should it be conceded that the contention
renders doubtful the validity of the requirement that chiropractors have a knowledge of materia medica and some other
subjects referred to in the statute, it
would not render the law invalid, because
when there is any reasonable doubt as to
the validity of a statute, the doubt must
be resolved in favor of validity.
It is
only where the invalidity or unconstitutio'nali ty is clear and beyond civil law
that the courts have the right to declare
a law, or any part of the same, invalid.
(Emphasis added, p.225)
Under
assertion
very

most,

of

such

a

standard,

unconstitutionality

appellant

has

invalidity of § 78-14-8.

raised

the

instant

cannot
only

appellant's

prevail.
"doubts"

as

At

the

to

the

More specifically, the law of Utah

places on the party challenging the statute the burden of
proving unconstitutionality.

If a rational relation exists
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between the classification and the purpose of the
the

statute

must

be

upheld.

A

classification

statute,
is

never

unreasonable or arbitrary if a reasonable basis exists anc
there

is

uniform

application

of

the

act.

See

Utah

Fan

Bureau Insurance Co. v. Utah Insurance Guaranty Assoc., 56\
P.2d 751

(Utah, 1977).
Under

the

States Constitution,

Fourteenth

Amendment

as

under

well

as

to

the

United

the Constitution of

Utah, only a reasonable relation between the classification
and the purpose of the statute, and uni form application, are
required

to

withstand

protection.

As

is

attacks

amply

based

on

illustrated

a

in

denial
Point

of
I

equal

of

this

brief, such a reasonable relation surely exists here.
Indeed, in the case at bar there exists not only a
inte~

"reasonable relation," but also the compelling state
est

that

is

appellant

the

essence

erroneously

of

the

asserts

"strict

is

scrutiny"

applicable

here.

whid
The

interest is insuring that an adequate level of professiona:
medical care is available to the people of Utah.
lature

has

found

that

in

order

to

achieve

this

The legisstate o'

interest, it is necessary to control the "crisis" of
malpractice

insurance via

the

comprehensive

Utah Health Care Malpractice Act.
78-14-8,

early
suits.

U.C.A.

claims

(1979)

is

settlement

clearly
and

to

scheme

medic~

of tb,

The notice provision o:
and directly related tc
discouraging

frivolou

Both of those o!:ijectives have the effect of decree:
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ing

medical

provision,

malpractice

78-14-8,

insurance

U.C.A.

(1979)

premiums.

The

notice

is not objectionable as

denying equal protection.
Appellant
claim

that

makes

78-14-8,

special legislation.

the

U.C.A.

further
(1979)

(although

constitutes

related)
forbidden

Appellant's brief states that:

. • • "No justification exists for singling out the medical profession and provid ing
it with procedural protection not afforded
other groups." • . •
(P.18, Emphasis added.)
Appellant demonstrates a basic misunderstanding of
the

nature

of

(1979).

The

interest

in

the

procedures mandated

statute's
adequate

purpose

medical

is

care,

to

by 78-14-8,

U.C.A.

protect

public

not

the

the

interests

of

physicians who would seek to avoid malpractice suits.
Section 78-14-8, U.C.A. (1979) is clearly a general

law.

In

U.F.B.I.

Co.

v.

U.I.G.A.,

supra,

the

Court

states:
. • . a law is general when it applies equally
to all persons embraced in a class founded upon
some natural, intrinsic, or constitutional distinction.
It is special legislation if it confers particular privileges or imposes peculiar
disabilities, or burdensome conditions in the
exercise of a common right; upon a class of persons arbitrarily selected, from the general body
of those who stand in precisely the same relation to the subject of the law.
The constitutional prohibition of special legislation does
not preclude legislative classification, but
only requires the classification to be reasonable.
{p.754)
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Medical malpractice plaintiffs stand

in a differ-

ent position than plaintiffs in other professional malpracThe difference lies

t ice act ions.

in the vital

to society of insuring adequate medical care.
14-8, U.C.A.

(1979)

importance
Sect ion 78-

helps to meet that interest of society,

and it does so in a fair and equitable manner.

It operates

uniformly on all those within a class, namely, plaintiffs in
health

care

malpractice

actions.

It

clearly

meets

all

constitutional requirements, and must be upheld.

CONCLUSION

Since
U.C.A.

( 1979)

the
is

notice

clearly

required

valid

by

under

Section

the

78-14-B,

Constitution of

Utah, and as such notice, a condition precedent to a
malpractice

action

order of dismissal

was

not

given

in

of appellant's

the

case

cause of

at

bar

DATED this

I

the

action must be

affirmed.

.

medic~

I

'--·
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